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Culture, Cash or Calories: Interpreting
Alaska Native Subsistence Rights
JEREMY DAVID SACKS*
This Article examines the cultural basis for subsistence laws in
Alaska and argues that it is inappropriate. After describing two
conflicting definitions of the term "subsistence," the Article then
provides an overview of the history of the federal government's
treatment of Alaska Natives. Next, the Article analyzes provisions
of both federal and state subsistence law and criticizes their
emphasis on the vague, undefinable concept of culture. Then, the
Article demonstrates the weakness of such an approach in federal
wildlife laws. Finally, the Article concludes by proposing a
subsistence rights trading system among Alaska Native groups that
would avoid the problems associated with culture-based subsis-
tence laws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Culture is not static. If it is, then what you have to do is treat
us as museum pieces.
-Ralph Eluska, president, Akhiok-Kaguyak, Inc.'
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1. Bill Sharpsteen, Native Claims: Natives Profit from Alaska's Natural
Resources; EcoRepor4 BUzzWORM, May 1992 (quoting Ralph Eluska), available
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I think the times and conditions are changing in the Arctic and
I think the Eskimo and the people who live there are going to
use every means they have available to increase the efficiency of
their operations still within the bounds of the uses that they have
applied to the animals. It's very difficult now to determine what
native really means as far as their utilization of these animals
and the way they go about harvesting them.
-Ben Hilliker, former Alaska Deputy Commissioner
for Sportfish and Game2
When compared to the legal regimes governing Native Ameri-
cans in the lower forty-eight United States,3 Alaska Natives'
subsistence hunting and fishing rights appear to be an equitable
response to a difficult political issue: balancing Natives' subsistence
needs with the need to preserve natural resources. Rather than
living on reservations like their counterparts in other states, most
Alaska Natives continue to live their chosen lifestyle.4 For a
number of reasons, including the abundance of wildlife resources
and the high ratio of Natives to non-Natives in Alaska's population,
both federal and Alaska laws allow subsistence hunting and
fishing5 Responding to guilt stemming from historically harsh
federal Indian policies, 6 commentators7 and legislators' have
in LEXIS, News Library, Arenws File.
2. Ocean Mammal Protection, 1972: Hearings on the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1972) (testimony of Ben
Hilliker).
3. See Monroe E. Price, A Moment in History: The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, 8 UCLA-ALASKA L. REv. 89, 89-95 (1979) (examining the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act in the context of the history of federal Indian policy
and determining that Indian policy reflects dominant cultural beliefs or ethics
throughout American history).
4. James M. Boardman, Casenote, McDowell v. State of Alaska: Is a Limited
Entry Subsistence System on the Horizon?, 26 WiLLAMETrE L. REV. 999, 1001
(1990). The author notes that "subsistence is a crucial part of the rural Alaska
economy and the native Alaska culture. Congress recognized the significance of
subsistence rights to both the economy and the culture by enacting ANILCA."
Id.
5. E.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 3111-3126 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1992).
6. See generally Price, supra note 3, at 90-95 (recounting the troubled
treatment of Native Americans in the American experience in light of the
dominant cultural assumptions of the day).
7. E.g., Karen J. Atkinson, The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation
Act: Striking the Balance in Favor of "Customary and Traditional" Subsistence
Uses by Alaska Natives, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421 (1987); David S. Case,
Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can Alaska Natives Have a More "Effective
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embraced subsistence rights as a mechanism that allows Natives to
live a "traditional" lifestyle, untouched by capitalist greed.
However, guilt is an unreliable mortar with which to build a
legal edifice. Basing Alaska Native subsistence laws on guilt-driven
"cultural" reasons produces a variety of critical flaws, ranging from
false assumptions about cultural continuity to practical problems
with applying a non-rational legal standard. A better approach
grounds subsistence laws in a non-cultural, need-based motive
tempered by an understanding of Natives' desire to conserve
adaptable traditions.' An examination of Alaska Natives' current
subsistence rights and an inquiry into the policies behind Native
exemptions to wildlife protection laws demonstrate the problems
inherent in culturally based subsistence rights.
This Article dissects and critiques the current cultural jus-
tification for Native subsistence uses and argues that a non-
culturally based rationale strikes a better balance between the twin
goals of meeting tangible Native needs and practicing rational
resource management. Part JI provides a background to the
problem, both by analyzing various meanings of "subsistence" and
by offering a history of federal policy toward Alaska Natives. Part
III outlines and analyzes current federal and Alaska law governing
the right to use subsistence resources in Alaska. Part IV criticizes
the basis for the Alaska Native exemption in federal wildlife
protection laws, and Part V concludes by proposing an alternate
means of regulating Native subsistence rights in Alaska.
Voice"?, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 1009 (1989); Mary Kancewick & Eric Smith,
Subsistence in Alaska: Towards a Native Priority, 59 UMKC L. REV. 645 (1991).
8. Lobbying for a Native exception to the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
Senator Ted Stevens played the guilt card. He argued that "[i]f Congress enacts
provisions outlawing all but subsistence hunting by Alaskan Natives, not only will
this proud group of Americans have their economic livelihood stripped from them,
but they will face the certain fate of cultural extinction." 118 CONG. REC. 8400
(1972).
9. Subsistence hunting and fishing is necessary for many Natives' survival, and
it links them to their history by binding them to their traditional lands. See
generally DAVID S. CAsE, ALAsKA NATIvEs AND AMEIcAN LAWS 275-76 (1984)
(explaining different notions of subsistence and their importance to Alaska
Natives).
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II. THE LAST FRONTIER: BACKGROUND TO ALASKA'S
CURRENT SUBSISTENCE USE PROBLEM
A. Defining Terms: Subsistence and a Necessity-Based Model
Before examining cultural justifications for a legal subsistence
regime, one must first understand what is meant by subsistence.
David Case argues that the term has two principal meanings, one
rooted in a European mindset, and the other stemming from Native
experience." The "Western" meaning of subsistence "connotes
the bare eking out of an existence, a marginal ... way of life.""
This definition implicates both necessity and the economics of
scarcity. Case describes this activity as "sustenance," necessary for
the individual and for the community, albeit for purely physical
reasons.'2 According to Case, "[t]his is not only a matter of
choice but of necessity imposed by a combination of factors,
including great distance from other food sources, chronic regional
unemployment, and resulting lack of cash to exchange for imported
food."'3 Consequently, "nutrition, location, and a weak position
in the cash economy combine to make rural communities physically
and economically reliant on subsistence uses of resources."' 4
However, as understood by Alaska Natives, subsistence has a
larger meaning. It is tied to their culture and helps define their
self-identity; the hunt itself perpetuates group identity and survival.
As Mary Kancewick and Eric Smith note, "Alaska Natives speak
of subsistence not just as a way to feed their families, but as a way
to be themselves-a way to be land-linked tribal peoples."'"
Under Case's rubric, this definition encompasses both cultural and
social values in addition to traditions and customs. "For Natives
engaged in subsistence uses, the very acts of hunting, fishing, and
gathering, coupled with the seasonal cycle of these activities and
the sharing and celebrations which accompany them are intricately
10. Case, supra note 7, at 1009-12.
11. Id. at 1009.
12. CASE, supra note 9, at 275. Throughout this article, the term "sustenance"
will refer to this need-based model of subsistence uses.
13. Id.
14. Id This conception of subsistence is often misunderstood. See Kancewick
& Smith, supra note 7, at 648 (explaining that non-Native critiques of Native
sustenance hunting are often driven by misconception).
15. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 7, at 649.
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woven into the fabric of their social, psychological, and religious
ife."1
6
In balancing Native needs and desires with rational wildlife
management, both state and federal authorities should recognize
that there are two competing understandings of subsistence taking.
If the main goal of wildlife management legislation is to preserve
wildlife resources for future use, 7 and if abundant wildlife stocks
in Alaska allow Native subsistence taking without a harmful impact
on those stocks, the Western definition of subsistence is the more
sensible. That definition is centered around need and scarcity,
eminently quantifiable factors that provide the bases for coherent
regulatory decision making. However, both Case and Kancewick
and Smith argue that the cultural meaning of the hunt to Natives
encompasses more than mere survival; it is tightly bound up in their
self-identity. 8 Thus, legislators face the difficult task of maintain-
ing wildlife resources while allowing Natives to hunt for their own
survival as well as the survival of the hunt in Native culture.
At first glance, many Alaska Native subsistence provisions
appear reasonable, at least in terms of physical necessity and
democratic theory. These laws allow Alaska Natives to choose how
to live their lives, as long as they participate in the American
political system. Under such conditions, justifying subsistence in
terms of "necessity" is consistent with Natives' desire to maintain
cultural traditions. Under a necessity-based system, wildlife
resource uses that are central to Native traditions may be main-
tained as long as the resource can bear the use. Such an approach
permits Native Alaskans to continue their chosen activities on an
equal footing with other political actors. 9 In addition, a law
based on non-cultural justifications can be reconciled more easily
with the eventual need to curtail hunting or fishing so that a
particular resource may be sustained. Thus, a legal framework
16. CASE, supra note 9, at 276.
17. For example, the House report on the Marine Mammal Protection Act
explained that "it seems elementary common sense to the Committee that
legislation should be adopted to require that we act conservatively-that no steps
should be taken regarding these animals that might prove to be adverse or even
irreversible in their effects until more is known." H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 15 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148.
18. Case, supra note 7, at 1009; Kancewick & Smith, supra note 7, at 649-51.
19. This theory assumes that Natives enjoy both full access to information and
an ability to participate in meaningful rulemaking and legislation, presumptions
that may be open to debate.
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based on a "necessity" justification strikes a critical balance
between the two competing interests underlying the subsistence
laws: Native needs and rational resource use.
However, the body of federal and Alaskan subsistence law is
based largely on cultural justifications, which may not be compati-
ble with either Native needs or rational resource use. As a result,
policy justifications grounded in cultural language can cause abuse
on two fronts. At one extreme, such laws may allow Native
subsistence rights to thwart sensible resource management,' while
at the other, they may artificially arrest Native culture in a mythical
past.2'
B. Problems with the Cultural Approach
Culture is not a monolith. It is comprised of individual
identities driven by individual and group experiences. As historian
E.P. Thompson explains:
Culture is a pool of diverse resources, in which traffic passes
between the literate and the oral, the superordinate and the
subordinate, the village and the metropolis; it is an arena of
conflictual elements, which requires some compelling pres-
sure-as, for example, nationalism or prevalent religious ortho-
doxy or class consciousness-to take from as a "system." And,
indeed, the very term "culture," with its cozy invocation of
consensus, may serve to distract attention from social and
cultural contradictions, from the fractures and oppositions within
the wholel
Thus, no Native culture remains absolutely primeval or
sacrosanct; all are affected by contact with the "other" in a continu-
20. Applying a blanket cultural justification does not sufficiently account for
localized resource concerns, which, in some instances, may be unquestionably more
important than cultural protection. For example, some argue that Alaska Native
subsistence exceptions to the Endangered Species Act should be applicable to
Native Americans throughout the United States. This logic makes sense only
under a cultural justification, as it would be inappropriate for non-Natives to
distinguish between the cultures of Native Alaskans and Native Floridians.
However, from a need-based perspective, the larger population of endangered
animals in Alaska justifies the Native Alaskan exemption, whereas taking one of
the few remaining Florida panthers would seriously threaten the species. See
United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1496 (S.D. Fla. 1987); infra notes 154-
213 and accompanying text (discussing the Alaska Native exception to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act).
21. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
22. E.P. THOMPSON, CUSTOMS IN COMMON: STUDIES IN TRADITIONAL
POPULAR CULTURE 6 (1991).
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ing cycle of action and reaction.' Culture is not static; group
cohesion grows over time and ultimately defines group conscious-
ness in a reaction to material surroundings. 4 In this important
respect, it is folly to base legal policy on purely cultural expecta-
tions, leaving material conditions unexamined.1
Consequently, a cultural justification for legal policy is difficult
to apply. It generates problematic results, ranging from the
dominant social group setting cultural expectations for a minority
to the legal institutionalization of a standard that seeks to freeze an
evolving culture in defining a material entitlement. On a
theoretical level, anthropologist Clifford Geertz has explained the
difficulty of understanding the cultural meanings of a different
group or society. Expanding on Thompson's ideas, Geertz explains
that it is difficult for an outsider, such as a regulator or legislator,
to comprehend the real meaning of the hunt as a cultural touch-
stone, by the very nature of his or her being an outsider.2 7 While
23. For example, Thompson proclaims in an earlier work that "we cannot
understand class unless we see it as a social and cultural formation, arising from
processes which can only be studied as they work themselves out over a
considerable historical period." E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
WORKING CLASS 11'(1966).
24. Rather than toe the Marxist line that class is part of the superstructure in
the historical dialectic, Thompson reasons that class is an event, something that
happens in human relationships as a result of temporal experiences. Id. at 9.
25. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
(1973). Geertz argues that culture is most properly characterized as shared
meaning given to certain activities or actions. "Culture is public because meaning
is." Id. at 12. Culture is not simply cerebral, existing in the thoughts of
individuals. In seeking out the knowledge that opens up a culture to outsiders,
one must keep an eye on the material conditions that drive cultural meaning and
change. After relating the famous East Indian tale about the world balancing on
the back of an elephant resting on an infinite stack of turtles, Geertz addresses this
point: "The danger that cultural analysis, in search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,
will lose touch with the hard surfaces of life-with the political, economic,
stratificatory realities within which men are everywhere contained-and with the
biological and physical necessities on which those surfaces rest, is an ever-present
one." Id. at 30. One must "train such analysis on such realities and such
necessities in the first place." Id
26. See Price, supra note 3, at 89 ("[S]tatutes relating to Indians can be
analyzed... because of the way in which they portray, or, more subtly, objectify
[the dominant] community's sense of its goals and ideals.").
27. See GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 13 ("What.. .most prevents those of us
who grew up winking other winks or attending other sheep from grasping what
people are up to is not ignorance as to how cognition works ... [but] a lack of
1995] 253
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the outsider may be able to partially understand the contextual
meaning of the subsistence hunt in the Native culture, his or her
interpretation of the hunt is different from that of the Natives. The
outsider brings his or her own cultural accretions to bear in viewing
a foreign ritual, at least partially interpreting the Native meaning
in light of a meaning with which he or she is familiar.2
Thus, culturally driven subsistence laws assume a legislative
intimacy with Native culture that is impossible to ascribe to non-
Natives. Culturally based laws establish rights that Western judges
and lawyers cannot fully understand, yet these participants shape
their interpretation. This result is dangerous for two reasons. On
one hand, it creates the potential for Native groups to manipulate
the laws in their favor by claiming an exclusively correct interpreta-
tion,' upsetting the balance between resource preservation and
Native needs. If rule makers and legal interpreters cannot under-
stand the basis for the laws, they may find it difficult to challenge
Native interpretations. On the other hand, culturally based laws
permit legal decision making to reflect majority cultural values that
may harm Native interests.30 Put simply, Western judges may
heed their own cultural biases when weighing Native subsistence
uses against competing non-Native claims. If there is no ostensibly
"neutral" standard to which a court may look, legal decisions might
merely reflect a court's own value choices, which are more likely to
be driven by a non-Native cultural understanding. 1
familiarity with the imaginative universe within which their acts are signs.").
28. Id. at 14-15. Geertz argues that even anthropological tracts "are
themselves interpretations, and second and third order ones to boot. (By
definition, only a 'native' makes first order ones; it's his culture.) They are, thus,
fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are 'something made,' 'something
fashioned."' Id at 15.
29. See Didrickson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 796 F. Supp 1281,
1289-90 (D. Alaska 1991) (noting that the Native plaintiff implied that "tradition-
al" Native crafts are best defined by Natives themselves).
30. Price, supra note 3, at 89-90.
31. As one commentator explains:
I have never been impressed by the argument that, as complete
objectivity is impossible in these matters (as, of course, it is) one might
as well let one's sentiments run loose.... Nor, on the other hand, have
I been impressed with claims that structural linguistics, computer
engineering, or some other advanced form of thought is going to enable
us to understand men without knowing them. Nothing will discredit a
semiotic approach to culture more quickly than allowing it to drift into
a combination of intuitionism and alchemy, no matter how elegantly the
intuitions are expressed or how modem the alchemy is made to look.
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Geertz's paradigm points to more flaws in the cultural justifica-
tion. Creating legal fights from cultural meaning is similar to
building a house on a fault line; the base beneath the superstruc-
ture is constantly shifting. For example, Case, a proponent of
culturally based subsistence laws, concedes that "[flt is unrealistic.
to require cultural or social values to remain forever fixed; indeed
change is common to all societies."'32 Yet at the same time, Case
states that changing cultural expectations should not justify the sale
of subsistence resources by Natives in commercial markets.33 Case
refuses to understand that a culturally based subsistence regime
necessarily implicates legal rights as cultural values change. If
culture is always changing, and if legal fights are set by evolving
cultural uses, then there can be no cultural justification for
prohibiting Natives from depleting resources by entering commer-
cial markets when the Natives themselves view these sales as
culturally desirable. Thus, Case's own arguments demonstrate that
a culturally based subsistence policy undermines the rational
management of natural resources.
34
Like Thompson,35 Geertz asserts that cultural meaning shifts
constantly to respond to changing material circumstances and the
group's understanding of that change.36 It is impossible to
preserve a culture by legislative fiat; cultural preservation assumes
static material surroundings and static contextual meaning, and,
therefore, it can be achieved only in a museum.37 Federal and
Alaska lawmakers must understand that culture is not "a self-
contained 'super-organic' reality with forces and purposes of its
GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 30.
32. CASE, supra note 9, at 276.
33. Id.
34. Case's attempts to reconcile these conflictiing views are not convincing:
"[W]hen it comes to resource preservation, it is important that resources which are
harvested for subsistence do not become commercially exploited. Thus, while
concepts of tradition or custom do not prohibit evolution of subsistence cultural
or social values, they allow only limited transformation into commercial
enterprise." Id.
35. In the eighteenth century setting about which he wrote, Thompson asserts
that "custom ... was in a continual flux. ... [Fjar from having the steady
permanence suggested by the word 'tradition,' custom was a field of change and
contest, an arena in which opposing interests made conflicting claims." THOMP-
SON, supra note 23, at 6.
36. GEERTz, supra note 25, at 28-30.
37. Id. at 10-11.
1995]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
own." 3 Rather, culture adapts itself to surroundings, including
legal rights and obligations that are placed on a group.
Legislation that strives to preserve a culture often exposes that
culture's dynamic nature instead. For example, although the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA") 9 was designed
to protect Alaska Native culture, it did so by providing Natives
with shares in corporate landholding structures.' Unwittingly, the
introduction of Western forms of governance to preserve Native
culture irrevocably altered it.4
A final flaw in the cultural approach is its pernicious effects on
the cultures that it seeks to "preserve." Not only does instituting
Native culture within a Western legal framework inherently change
that culture, but a blanket cultural justification also ignores contem-
porary differences between Native Alaskan cultures. After
ANCSA, some tribes have become rich with oil wealth; while
others still hunt wildlife for their basic survival.42 The sustenance
needs of these tribes vary greatly,43 but a cultural model homoge-
nizes all Native cultures by assuming their material needs, and
hence their cultures,' are identical.
All of these flaws reveal themselves in culturally based federal
and Alaskan subsistence laws. Before examining these laws, their
justifications, and their applications, a closer look at the history of
38. Id. at 11. At the same time, culture is neither a "brute pattern of
behavioral events we observe in fact to occur in some identifiable community,"
nor is it simply resident in the human mind. Id.
39. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). For the stated purpose of ANCSA, see
H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2192, 2193.
40. See Price, supra note 3, at 95-96.
41. As Geertz would argue, institutionalizing a version of "Native" culture
must change the culture itself, since it changes the material, real-world bases for
the culture. See Geertz, supra note 25. For a full discussion of ANCSA and its
effects on Native culture, see infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
42. See Timothy Egan, The Great Alaska Debate, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1991
(Magazine), at 21, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File (describing the
Gwich'in tribe's desire to bar development of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
in order to protect the Caribou upon which they rely for food and contrasting that
desire with the pro-development position of the Inupiats, who stand to gain
millions of dollars if the refuge is opened to development by oil companies).
43. Id.
44. GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 28-30.
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federal Indian policy is necessary to understand better the roots of
modem subsistence policy.
C. A History of Federal Policy Toward Alaska Natives
At various periods in American history, the federal trust
relationship4' with Native Americans has embraced separatism,
assimilation and a recognition of an ethnic identity.46 Federal
policy has influenced Native culture throughout American history
through its physical effects on Natives' opportunities and lifes-
tyles.47 Seeking to break the cycle of dependence endemic to the
reservation system,' the federal government, and later the state
of Alaska, implemented a variety of subsistence policies in Alaska.
Legislators designed these policies to avoid the lackluster treatment
that had resulted in the mass destruction of Native cultures in the
lower forty-eight United States.49 In enacting subsistence policies
based on cultural reasoning, federal and state legislators failed to
see that both rational resource management and the needs of
Alaska Natives could be served by a necessity-based subsistence
approach.
Although they are ostensibly subject to the same trust relation-
ship as Native Americans in the continental United States, Alaska
Natives initially were not treated as dependent peoples by the
federal government5 Alaska came under U.S. jurisdiction after
the 1867 U.S.-Russia Treaty of Cession,"' a time when "much of
the body of Indian Law had already developed in response to the
45. For an explanation of the federal trust relationship, see Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
46. Price, supra note 3, at 89-95.
47. GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 30.
48. Price, supra note 3, at 92.
49. See generally Shelley D. Turner, The Native American's Right to Hunt and
Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the
Effect of European Contac and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life,
19 N.M. L. REV. 377,383-98 (1989) (explaining the effect of European contact and
U.S. policies on Native American culture).
On the federal government's relationship with Alaska Natives, see Todd
Moster, The Effects of Increased Tribal and State Autonomy on the Special
Relationship Between Alaska Natives and the Federal Government An Overview,
10 UCLA-ALAsKA L. REv. 183,185-98 (1981); see also Kancewick & Smith, supra
note 7, at 652-58 (explaining subsistence relationships in federal laws).
50. CASE, supra note 9, at 6.
51. Mar. 30, 1867, U.S.-Russia, 15 Stat. 539.
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circumstances of Natives in the lower forty-eight states."52 Prior
to the cession, most Natives had little contact with their Russian
rulers,5 3 although a number of coast-dwelling Natives today have
Russian surnames and follow the Russian Orthodox religion.54
"The resulting absence of a history of past hostilities apparently
minimized any immediate attempts to control Native behavior
when the Alaskan Territory came under American jurisdiction."55
While conflicts over natural resources characterized the American
westward expansion, Alaska's abundant resources and small settler
population obviated the need for such skirmishes. 6
However, the U.S.-Russian treaty hinted at second-class citizen
status for the Natives. The treaty stated that:
inhabitants of the ceded territory [shall enjoy] all the rights,
advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States, and
shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their
liberty, property and religion, [but]... uncivilized tribes [will be]
subject to such laws and regulations as the United States may,
from time to time, adopt in regard to aboriginal tribes of that
country.57
52. Moster, supra note 49, at 185.
53. Id. at 186. According to David H. Getches and Charles F. Wilkinson,
Russian "settlements were always small and scattered. The average Russian
population of Alaska was only about 550 persons and the only substantial
permanent settlements were at Kodiak and Sitka." DAVID H. GETCHES &
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 775
(1986).
54. National Geographic Speciab Island of the Giant Bears (PBS television
broadcast, Jan. 12, 1994). This broadcast presented a prime example of mixed
cultures in Alaska, a Russian Orthodox priest blessing a Native diesel-powered
fishing fleet.
55. Moster, supra note 49, at 186.
56. As one commentator explains:
Until the 1960s there was no need to settle Native claims because there
was little conflict between Natives and non-Natives over Alaska's land
and resources. Natives were never at war with the United States, they
were never conquered, and few reservations were created. Unlike the
lower forty-eight states, there were never any treaties between the United
States and Native groups designating lands which Natives were entitled
to occupy or defining their hunting and fishing rights. The federal
government ended formal treaty-making with tribes in 1871, a century
before the federal government undertook to resolve [Alaska] Native...
claims.
Atkinson, supra note 7, at 423.
57. Treaty of Cession, U.S.-Russia, art. M, May 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539, 542.
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Moreover, from the Organic Act of 188458 until 1900, congres-
sional treatment of Alaska Natives implied that, unlike other
Native Americans, Alaska Natives did not have an aboriginal group
property right to the vast lands that they inhabited.59  Rather,
these laws equated Native and non-Native possession, entitling
"Alaska Natives only to land.., in their individual and actual use
and occupancy.' 6°
Thus, as early as 1884, federal policy toward Alaska Natives
diverged drastically from policy toward Natives in other states.61
No federal treaties were made with Native groups, so no treaty
clearly established a federal trust relationship in Alaska.62 The
Allotment Act' did not apply because there were no reservations
in Alaska.' In addition, since they were not technically U.S.
citizens until 1924, Alaska Natives could not retain land under the
Homestead Act.6'
United States v. Berrigan66 first recognized a trust relationship
between the federal government and Alaska Natives, marking the
start of the federal government's attempt to rationalize its Alaska
58. Ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24 (1884).
59. CASE, supra note 9, at 6.
60. Id.
61. In addition, there was no distinction between Natives and non-Natives for
federal educational services until 1905. These services were administered by the
Bureau of Education, not the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id at 6-7.
62. Sarah Arnott, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Legislation
Appropriate for the Past and the Future, 9 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 135, 141 (1981).
63. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (authorizing the President to allot land to
Natives in reservations).
64. Arnott, supra note 62, at 141.
65. The Homestead Act is a series of laws. The original Homestead Act, ch.
75,12 Stat. 392 (1862), was amended repeatedly and codified at 43 U.S.C.A. § 161.
A version of the Act can be found at 43 U.S.C.A. § 161 (West 1986). However,
the Homestead Act was repealed by the Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579,
90 Stat. 2787, effective in Alaska on Oct. 21, 1986. Alaska Natives were granted
citizenship in the Act of June 2,1924, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 253. See Arnott, supra note
62, at 141.
66. 2 Alaska 442 (D. Alaska 1905) (holding that the federal government had
the right and duty to sue to prevent non-Natives from acquiring lands occupied by
Native Alaskans). According to Case, "it is most significant that the United States
brought this suit in the first place; it indicates an executive determination that the
federal government had an obligation to protect Native aboriginal possession from
non-Native encroachment." CASE, supra note 9, at 7.
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and continental Native policies.67 Congress subsequently passed
the Alaska Native Allotment Act,6" allowing individual Alaska
Natives to retain up to 160 acres of non-taxable, inalienable
"homestead" land. Although this policy shadowed the Dawes
Act,69 which set up a similar allotment system in the continental
United States, only eighty allotments were granted before Alaska's
statehood.' Other federal initiatives included the 1926 Townsite
Act,71 allowing Natives to hold title to townsite lots, and the 1936
extension of the Wheeler-Howard Act to Alaska,72 authorizing an
Alaskan reservation system. However, only one reservation was
established in Alaska, and according to one commentator, "[t]he
lack of reservations is the single most significant factor distin-
guishing Alaska Natives from their counterparts in the south."'73
While the federal government officially applied continental
Native policies to Alaska Natives, the laws implementing those
policies were not vigorously enforced. Consequently, Alaska
Natives' material conditions were different from those of their
southern counterparts. Though efforts of the Bureau of Indian
67. In a much later case, North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332
(D.D.C.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court
outlined the current federal trust responsibility to Alaska Natives:
A trust responsibility can only arise from a statute, treaty, or executive
order.... Every statute and treaty designed to protect animals or birds
has a specific exemption for Native Alaskans who hunt the species for
subsistence purposes. These statutes have been construed as specifically
imposing on the Federal government a trust responsibility to protect the
Alaskan Natives' rights of subsistence hunting.
IL at 344. By grounding the trust relationship in statutes and treaties, the North
Slope Borough court relied on a distinctly different justification than that chosen
by the Berrigan court.
68. Ch. 2469, 34 Stat. 197 (1906). This act was codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 270-1
to 270-3, but it was repealed with a savings clause by section 18 of ANCSA, Pub.
L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688, 710 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1617 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)). See CASE, supra note 9, at 9.
69. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
70. Arnott, supra note 62, at 142.
71. Ch. 379, 44 Stat. 629 (1926).
72. Ch. 254, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936) (codified at 25 U.S.C.A. § 496 (West 1984)
and 48 U.S.C.A. § 358a (West 1987)). Section 2 of the act was repealed by the
Act of Oct 1, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at various places in
the United States Code), and section 1 was transferred to 25 U.S.C. § 473a (1988).
73. Moster, supra note 49, at 186. One reservation was established in 1891 for
the Metlakatla tribe on Annette Island. Id. at 186 n.21.
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Affairs (the "BIA")74 "to marry Native subsistence needs with
federal trust obligations often were inconsistent,"'75 subsistence
resources remained abundant in federally held Alaskan lands,76
and Natives were not stigmatized by a wrenching reservation
experience. International treaties, such as the Migratory Bird
Treaty77 and the North Pacific Fur Seal Convention,7 8 protected
Native subsistence uses, as did federal and territorial game laws.79
By 1958, when Alaska achieved statehood,"° "[n]o major entries
on the public domain had occurred to create the conflicts that
prevailed in colonial and early U.S. history when prospective
landowners moved progressively westward through Indian territo-
ry."81 In sum, abundant resources and a benign neglect of official
policy left Native lifestyles remarkably intact in comparison with
Native experiences in the lower forty-eight states."
This balance was threatened when a land crisis developed after
Alaska's statehood. While the state was allowed to select 102.5
million acres from the public domain, the Statehood Act' made
no mention of Native claims, "stating only that public lands that
might belong to [N]atives should remain under the jurisdiction of
the United States until disposal was made."'  This crisis evolved
into an impasse, and the federal government announced a land
74. The BIA is the branch of the Department of the Interior that implements
federal policy toward Native Americans. It gained responsibility for administering
Alaska Native affairs in 1931. CASE, supra note 9, at 9.
75. Id. at 12-13.
76. Arnott, supra note 62, at 143.
77. Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-U.K., 39 Stat. 1702. The original Migratory Bird
Treaty was concluded between the United States and Great Britain, signatory for
the Dominion of Canada.
78. July 7, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542. This treaty has since been superseded by the
Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Oct. 14, 1957, 8
U.S.T. 2284.
79. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 423 (noting that the Alaska Territory's first
game law exempted Native subsistence taking from its regulations, Act of June 13,
1902, ch. 1037, 32 Stat. 327).
80. Alaska achieved statehood in 1958 but was admitted into the Union on
January 3, 1959, upon issuance of Proclamation No. 3269, Jan. 3, 1959, 24 Fed.
Reg. 81 (1959), reprinted in 73 Stat. c16 (1959).
81. Arnott, supra note 62, at 143-44.
82. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 423.
83. Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
84. Arnott, supra note 62, at 144.
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freeze,85 delaying settlement of state land claims until Congress
approved ANCSA.86
Thus, ANCSA and the crisis that spawned it helped to
establish the parameters of modem Alaska Native subsistence
rights. Since ANCSA's disposition of state claims and Native land
uses came when many national and state fish and game laws were
being written, its resolution of the land freeze dramatically affected
subsequent federal and Alaska natural resource legislation.
III. SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS UNDER ANCSA, THE ALASKA
NATIONAL INTEREST LANDS CONSERVATION ACT AND ALASKA
LAW
A. ANCSA
Enacted on December 18, 1971, ANCSA' extinguishes
Alaska Native land claims, although it does not establish a Native
subsistence right. Unlike claim extinguishment legislation in the
lower forty-eight states, ANCSA does not herd Natives onto
reservations. Rather, ANCSA sets up Native corporations and
divides federally held Alaskan lands among these new entities."8
In an attempt to avoid the squalor and neglect characteristic of the
reservation system, ANSCA seeks to turn individual Natives into
capitalists by making them shareholders of Native corporations. 9
While culturally based Native subsistence statutes place too much
85. Public Land Order No. 4582, 34 Fed. Reg. 1025 (1969).
86. Arnott, supra note 62, at 144-46.
87. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
88. For the background and legislative history of ANCSA, see H.R. REP. No.
523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192.
89. Congressional findings in ANCSA are specifically based on a rationale of
economic need, rather than on the desire to maintain Natives' traditional lifestyle.
Although an economic necessity justification for subsistence allows the Natives to
choose their own cultural path, it begs the following question: what type of future
do Natives desire? If culture changes in response to material alterations in the
environment, then ANCSA sets a powerful cultural precedent, perhaps undercut-
ting any cultural justifications for a subsistence lifestyle. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("[T]he settlement should be accomplished rapidly, with
certainty, in conformity with the real economic and social needs of [the]
Natives."). The use of the word "social" in the statute is in juxtaposition with the
use of the word "cultural" in Alaska law; under Alaska law, the term "social
needs" justifies non-Native subsistence rights as well. See Atkinson, supra note 7,
at 426-27.
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emphasis on claims of cultural distinctiveness, ANCSA ignores
Native culture altogether. Although it provides Natives with a
form of control over their future, ANCSA abandons remote Native
communities to the corporate boardroom with little training, and
often at the expense of their historically chosen lifestyle.90 Since
ANCSA's corporate structure rewards the development of land
resources, it undercuts a choice to continue with traditional ways,
and its intent runs counter to the culture-based subsistence
justifications in subsequent federal laws.9'
While use of the corporate model to organize Native property
claims and interests was a landmark in the trust relationship and is
probably preferable to the reservation system,' the introduction
of distinctly modem Western forms of government changed the
material conditions driving Native culture.93 All Natives now have
an interest in protecting their corporate portfolios in addition to
hunting-and fishing. Indeed, after ANCSA, the Natives became
proficient at pressing their claims in Washington, D.C.94 The
Natives' successful lobbying efforts defeat the logic of grounding
subsistence entitlements solely in the need to preserve culture by
demonstrating the ease with which cultures can adapt to altered
material conditions.
As Monroe Price argues, ANCSA will continue to change
Native culture dramatically:
90. As Price writes, "Congress converted all Alaska Natives into members of
the corporate world, receivers of annual reports, proxy statements, solicitations and
balance sheets. The Native received a shotgun initiation into the American
mainstream." Price, supra note 3, at 95 (footnote omitted).
91. See, eg., 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2) (1994) (establishing a culture-based
subsistence definition in the Marine Mammal Protection Act).
92. Arthur Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1976, at
132, 133-34 ("ANCSA ... reflects a new departure in government dealings with
Indians-a policy which places on the natives alone the crucial task of translating
the immediate benefits of the settlement into permanent, socially and economically
productive enterprises.").
93. Price, supra note 3, at 96-97.
94. During the debates on the Marine Mammal Protection Act, numerous
letters and telegrams were introduced from Native communities lobbying for a
broad Native subsistence exception to the Act. See Ocean Mammal Protection,
1972: Hearings on the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 Before the
Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 212 (1972).
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[T]he construct of values that were respected in the historic
Native village will change. The corporate executives will be
those who are willing to forego subsistence activities, to place a
higher priority on board meetings than on salmon fishing, and to
spend time talking to lawyers and financiers and bankers rather
than the people of the villages.
In a sense, the gospel of capitalism has gripped the leader-
ship of the regional corporations just as in another day, another
kind of gospel was introduced for its educative and assimilative
influence. The profitmaking mandate has become a powerful
vision, a powerful driving force.95
Thus, among other problems with a cultural model, basing Native
subsistence on a desire to arrest cultural change or to harken back
to a pre-colonial Eden runs counter to the intent of ANCSA, the
law that established post-statehood property relationships in
Alaska.
B. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
Although ANCSA does not create a Native subsistence right,
a joint Senate and House conference committee intended for the
Secretary of the Interior to protect Native subsistence rights once
the ANCSA regime was in place.96 The Department of the
Interior failed to act by 1980, prompting Congress to address the
subsistence issue in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act ("ANILCA"),97 Title VIII of which also influences
Alaska subsistence policy. As Case explains:
ANILCA did not require the State to adopt a subsistence prefer-
ence or establish advisory councils and committees for regulation
of fish and game on state or even Native lands. But the price of
not doing so was that the State would not be able to regulate
fish and game on the more than one-half of the lands in the state
still in federal ownership.98
95. Price, supra note 3, at 100 (footnote omitted).
96. S. REP. No. 581, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1971) ("The conference
committee, after careful consideration, believes that all Native interests in
subsistence resource lands can and will be protected by the Secretary through the
exercise of his existing withdrawal authority .... The conference committee
expects both the Secretary and the State to take any action necessary to protect
the subsistence needs of the Natives."); see Case, supra note 7, at 1016.
97. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 3101-3233 (1994)).
98. Case, supra note 7, at 1017.
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Like other modem experiments in cooperative federalism, "Title
VIII did not compel the State of Alaska to do anything, but it
made the State an offer it couldn't refuse."99
Consequently, ANILCA establishes a Native subsistence right
on federal lands, including those administered by the state of
Alaska, and forms the basis for Alaska subsistence laws and
regulations."°  In doing so, ANILCA's subsistence policy is
premised largely on cultural assumptions,' 01 although the statute
involves some economic motivations as well."°  However, in
defining the term "subsistence" as "customary and traditional uses"
of wildlife resources by rural dwellers,0 3 ANILCA's intent and
policy justifications conflict with those of ANCSA, which strive to
make Natives conform to a new, wealth-maximizing corporate
identity. This tension, as well as the congressional unwillingness to
reconcile the Native and Western meanings of "subsistence," forms
a soft foundation for subsequent subsistence laws.
Unfortunately, many commentators fail to recognize this
conflict. For example, Karen Atkinson acknowledges that subsis-
tence hunting and fishing "is not only a matter of choice, but of
necessity imposed by a number of factors"" and that "[t]he
traditional subsistence economy of the Native villages has been
altered by contact with the outside."'0 5 However, she asserts that
since "[i]t is a system for distribution and exchange of subsistence
products which operates according to complex codes of participa-
tion, partnership, and obligation," subsistence is properly defined
as the "customary and traditional" uses of resources)°6
By conceding that Native subsistence culture is evolving, while
at the same time advocating subsistence rights grounded in a
cultural rationale, Atkinson offers a vague right that will be difficult
to apply, thereby undermining rational wildlife management.
Courts, especially when reviewing rulemaking and regulatory
99. Id.
100. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
101. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 438 ("At the heart of the subsistence priority is
Congress's overriding commitment to protect Native subsistence lifestyle and
culture.").
102. See 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (1994) (finding that the continuing opportunity for
Alaska Natives to practice subsistence is essential to their economic existence).
103. Id. § 3113.
104. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 427.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 428.
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statutes, are best at applying concrete, rational definitions, not
statutes defined along the hazy contours of a particular group's
cultural context. Furthermore, a cultural justification provides little
guidance to the Secretary of the Interior, who must administer
wildlife resources. The Secretary may encounter difficulties in
attempting to reconcile a scientifically based wildlife conservation
scheme with a subsistence definition that affords Natives an
entitlement based on cultural practices.
However, Atkinson is not alone in her mistake. Even
ANILCA's legislative history explains that traditional uses are "not
restricted to methods passed down from generation to generation
and [are] not intended to foreclose the use of new, unidentified
means of surface transportation."'"17 Thus, snowmobiles and
airplanes could become traditional vehicles for subsistence hunting
within ANILCA's attempt to protect Native culture. That
ANILCA could not define traditional Native culture without
acknowledging its modem evolution demonstrates the weakness of
a culture-based approach. As Native culture adapts to modem
surroundings, the effectiveness of ANILCA's resource management
provisions will wane due to its reliance upon Native culture as the
lodestar of its subsistence policy.
C. Alaska State Law
Despite ANILCA's shortcomings, the Alaska legislature has
embraced its cultural approach in an effort to comply with Title
VIII and thereby gain control over federal lands in Alaska."~
Consequently, state subsistence policy affects wildlife regulation on
all public lands within the sthte, even though most land in Alaska
is not state-owned.1' 9
Like ANILCA, Alaska law recognizes a Native subsistence
right. Given its relatively abundant wildlife resources and the
economic and physical need of many rural residents to supplement
their diet with such foods,"10 Alaska traditionally has allowed the
subsistence taking of wildlife. Alaska's current subsistence hunting
107. Id. at 428-29 (citing S. REP. No. 1300, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 227 (1978)).
108. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
109. The Alaskan Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339
(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 6 (1988)), allowed the state to gain title to 103 million
acres out of the approximately 365 million acres that comprise the state.
110. CASE, supra note 9, at 275.
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and fishing scheme consists of legislation enacted in 1978,111
although post-ANILCA laws flesh out these provisions. The 1978
law established a Subsistence Division of the Alaska Department
of Fish and Game, which was to conduct studies of Alaskan
subsistence uses."' In addition, the law ordered the state Board
of Game and Board of Fisheries to craft regulations permitting
subsistence taking." The most controversial section of the law,
however, gave subsistence hunting and fishing priority if the overall
taking of a particular resource were restricted for conservation
purposes."4
ANILCA directed the state to devise a regulatory scheme "to
afford long-term protection to the subsistence way of life.""' By
1982, the state had created its regulatory program, largely adopting
ANILCA's definition of subsistence as the customary and tradition-
al uses of wildlife resources."6 However, a 1985 decision of the
111. Act effective Oct. 10, 1978, ch. 151, § 4, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 2 (2d
Sess.).
112. Id. For a lucid summary of Alaskan subsistence policy, see Atkinson,
supra note 7, at 431-33.
113. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 431. A brief tour of the current index to the
Alaska Administrative Code reveals an intricate tapestry of subsistence regulations
ranging from geographic limitations to species-specific fishing practices.
114. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(c) (1992). Part of this statute was invalidated
by the Alaska Supreme Court in McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989),
discussed supra, at notes 127-36 and accompanying text. Following McDowell, the
statute was amended to remove the subsistence preference, at least until October
1, 1996, when a delayed amendment is scheduled to shift the language back to that
struck down by the court. This maneuver again betrays different interpretations
of the statute: is it designed to perpetuate a "way of life" or to allow those who
need nourishment to find it in the wild? A subsistence preference seems to weigh
on the side of need-based reasoning, affording to those in need the ability to live
off the land, assuming that the definition of subsistence is economically grounded.
However, urban residents have expressed their position as endorsing a "no special
rights" for Natives mentality. A clear signal of the legislature's intent could
deflate their arguments.
115. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 428. ANILCA granted Alaska the right to
manage fish and wildlife on public lands if certain criteria were met, such as
compliance with ANILCA's subsistence provisions. Id. at 430; see also 16 U.S.C.
§ 3115 (1994).
116. Atkinson, supra note 7, at 431-32; see also Madison v. State Dep't of Fish
and Game, 696 P.2d 168, 176 n.13 (Alaska 1985) ("[The] words 'customary and
traditional' in the 1978 subsistence law were taken from § 703 of HR 39, 95th
Congress, 2nd Session (1978), which Congress passed in modified form in 1980 as
[ANILCA.]").
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Alaska Supreme Court, Madison v. State Department of Fish and
Game,"7 had a significant impact on the state program. In Madi-
son, a group of Native commercial fishermen challenged the state's
two-tiered regulations governing the issuance of subsistence fishing
permits."' The regulations gave a priority to "sustenance"
licenses over sport and commercial licenses if the state restricted
subsistence permits because of dwindling fish stocks."9
Qualification for this sustenance license preference was based on
a number of factors, including "customary and direct dependence"
on the resource, residency near the resource and the availability of
alternative resources.""
Holding for the commercial fishermen, the court stated that the
state could not restrict subsistence use based on rural residency,
121
since the sponsor of the controlling bill, Representative Anderson,
was on record opposing a rural residency requirement."' Accord-
ing to Representative Anderson, culture and history supported a
subsistence exception for both Natives and non-Native rural and
urban dwellers. During the floor debates on the bill, he stated that
"[t]he use of customary and traditional also is in recognition of a
historical use of fish and game for food, shelter, fuel, clothing,
tools, transportation, etc. This is not only in conformance with the
aboriginal uses, but also those that have come... later."'
However, Representative Anderson's statement is not as clear
as the court insists. His argument that historical Native and non-
Native uses must be protected can be interpreted in two conflicting
ways. It can support a necessity-based justification, since rural
dwellers living far from towns are dependent on fish and game for
their survival. It can also justify a culture-based explanation, since
those same individuals have an historic stake in preserving their
way of life. The law's preamble reflects this confusion, stating that
"'[i]t is in the public interest to clearly establish subsistence use as
117. 696 P.2d 168 (Alaska 1985).
118. Id. at 172.
119. Id. at 174. By the term "sustenance" licenses, I am referring to licenses
issued to people whose personal use of the fish is necessary for their survival.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 176-78.
122. Id. at 175.
123. Id. (quoting Rep. Anderson) (emphasis omitted).
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a priority use of Alaska's fish and game resources and to recognize
the needs, customs, and traditions of Alaskan residents.""'
The ultimate effect of the Madison court's action may have been
beneficial; it prompted an amendment of the Alaska subsistence
law that explicitly established a rural subsistence preference. This
amendment, enacted in a 1986 law, retained the two-tier subsis-
tence stratification but required all subsistence users to be rural
residents."2  Whatever the legislature's intent in enacting the
rural requirement, it permitted the rational enforcement of a need-
based policy of rationing limited wildlife resources. Even though
the 1986 law implemented ANILCA's charge, its text was free from
cultural assumptions about subsistence taking, apparently concerned
instead with a necessity-based model for subsistence rights. The
law's definition of "rural" implicated economics or need, stating
that a rural area is "[a] community or area of the state in which the
noncommercial, customary, and traditional use of fish or game for
personal or family consumption is a principal characteristic of the
economy of the community or area.'' 6
Unfortunately, the Alaska Supreme Court struck down the 1986
law in McDowell v. State,"'2 holding that the rural subsistence
preference violated sections 3, 15 and 17 of Article VIII of the
Alaska Constitution." Essentially, the court ruled that the rural
preference conflicted with the Alaska Constitution's common use
requirement in Article VIII, which governs the use of state natural
resources. Yet by reading the article to require common usage
of resources by all, the court trivialized the trust responsibility that
Article VIII imposes on the state. Rational management of natural
resources does not necessarily guarantee that all people will benefit
equally from those resources at all times.1'3
McDowell makes it even more difficult to divine the legislative
purpose behind Alaska's subsistence law. The court's anti-"special
rights" reasoning seems to argue for a non-cultural reading of both
124. Id. at 176 (quoting Act effective Oct. 10, 1978, ch. 151, § 1, 1978 Alaska
Sess. Laws 1 (2d Sess.)).
125. Act effective June 1, 1986, ch. 52, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws (codified at
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1987)).
126. ALAsKA STAT. § 16.05.940(25) (1987) (emphasis added).
127. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
128. Md at 9.
129. Boardman, supra note 4, at 1008-09.
130. Id. at 1008.
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the law and the state constitution, but, at the same time, it does not
lend itself to a rational need-based analysis of the policy.'
Furthermore, the court's language appears more political than legal;
its decision could be taken as a response to a 1982 ballot initiative
to repeal the 1978 subsistence law in favor of a "consumptive use"
priority."' According to Case, the failed 1982 initiative demon-
strates the continued political debate over a generally acceptable
rationale for subsistence laws. 33
Under the McDowell analysis, any statute that carves out taking
rights for a distinct group, whether cultural or economic, could be
suspect.' For example, the court explicitly rejected the state's
argument that the law at issue did not create an unconstitutional
"closed class," since class membership depended only on a
necessity-based residence requirement and was easily attained by
moving to a rural area. 5 According to James Boardman, creat-
ing a class based on financial need would violate the equal access
clause of section 15 of Article VIII. 36 Thus, while economic and
131. By reading sections 3,15 and 17 of Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution
together, the court "concluded that exclusive or special privileges to take fish and
game are prohibited." Boardman, supra note 4, at 1008; McDowell, 785 P.2d at
9.
132. CASE, supra note 9, at 275.
133. Id.
134. Boardman, supra note 4, at 1013.
135. McDowell, 785 P.2d at 6-7. The court stated:
We find this argument unpersuasive. If it were valid, virtually any
discrimination based on residence would be justified-the residents of the
disfavored area could simply move. Such a rationale is inconsistent with
the prevailing approach in territorial discrimination cases, which is to
subject territorial classifications to scrutiny under the equal protection
clause.
Id. at 7. Unfortunately, the court failed to look at the logic behind the law itself.
It read the provision as simply granting "special rights" to one group at the
expense of the other instead of understanding it to be a key component in a
regulatory policy designed to ensure sustainable fish and game use for all
Alaskans.
136. Boardman, supra note 4, at 1013. "Section 15 of article VIII contains an
express prohibition against exclusive or special privileges to take fish." Id. at 1008.
Section 15 reads, in pertinent part, that "[n]o exclusive right or special privilege
of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State."
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
Boardman argues that a limited-entry licensing system for subsistence fishing
could be constitutional, since a recent amendment to section 15 gives the state the
power to limit entry. Boardman, supra note 4, at 1014. A current limited-entry
commercial fishing system is based on an "optimum number of permits ...
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physical needs best justify a subsistence policy, such a standard
could be illegal under the court's dicta.
In response to McDowell, the Alaska legislature enacted yet
another subsistence law. Attempting to avoid an unconstitutional
"group" classification, the new law allows the establishment of a
subsistence priority in an area if subsistence is "a principal
characteristic of the economy, culture, and way of life."" In
contrast, areas that do not meet this requirement are classified as
"nonsubsistence areas," in which no subsistence priority may be
granted to any group.3 ' In deciding whether an area qualifies for
subsistence use, the state regulatory bodies may consider an array
of factors, including social and economic structure, economic
stability and cultural values associated with the taking of resources
in that area.'39 This law focuses on the aggregate use of fish and
game in an area, rather than on the users' characteristics, avoiding
the section 15 problems that could arise if certain individuals are
prohibited from subsistence hunting because of group member-
ship. 140
This focus blurs the law's rationale. By concentrating on geo-
graphic areas, the legislature fell back on a cultural justification,
since individual needs no longer could be considered. The
language of the law hints that past practice, not present need, is the
real touchstone. State regulators must determine "whether
dependence upon subsistence is a principal characteristic of the
economy, culture, and way of life" of an area,'14 not whether
subsistence is necessary for human sustenance based on the
availability of other foods. This design, even if intended to appease
the Alaska Supreme Court, will distract state game officials from
their task of preserving and managing wildlife resources. Under
this newest iteration of the law, they cannot count on a roughly
determined by state biologists for each fishery; these permits then are issued to
fishermen based on a point system." Id. at 1014 n.110. However, a limited-entry
subsistence scheme could be a bureaucratic and financial nightmare to enforce,
given the number of Native and non-Native subsistence takers. Furthermore, the
system would still have to allow urban residents an opportunity to compete for
licenses, which would contradict a true need-based rationale for subsistence fishing
and hunting. Perhaps the best solution is a judicial reversal of McDowell itself.
137. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(c) (1992).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 16.05.258(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(10).
140. Boardman, supra note 4, at 1008.
141. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(c) (1992).
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stable and quantifiable need-based Native subsistence harvest in
formulating long-term plans. Rather, their programs must now
take account of a malleable cultural practice, a criteria that is hard
to quantify and easy to exaggerate. Like Geertz's example of an
anthropologist who necessarily creates a fiction in describing a
culture, since he or she is at least one step removed from the
cultural context, 42 state regulators can base their judgments only
upon an impression of area history, not present material needs.
Thus, a cultural definition of subsistence undergirds present Alaska
law,143 a definition that mirrors the analogous provisions of
ANILCA.
This legal justification resurfaced most recently in State v.
Kenaitze Indian Tribe,'4 in which the Alaska Supreme Court
gave its constitutional blessing to state regulatory bodies' statutory
ability to create nonsubsistence areas. The court emphasized that
in such areas, "subsistence activities can still take place. What is
eliminated ... is the statutory subsistence priority.' 14  As the
Alaska Constitution's common use clauses "'are not implicated
unless limits are placed on the admission to resource user groups,"'
the existence of nonsubsistence areas is constitutional.4 6 Thus,
142. See GEERTZ, supra note 25, at 14-15; see also supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
143. The current Alaska subsistence statute provides that:
"subsistence uses" means the noncommercial, customary and traditional
uses of wild, renewable resources ... for direct personal or family
consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or transportation, for
the making and selling of handicraft articles out of nonedible by-products
of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or family consumption,
and for the customary trade, barter, or sharing for personal or family
consumption; in this paragraph, "family" means persons related by blood,
marriage, or adoption, and a person living in the household on a
permanent basis.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940(32) (1992). This language reflects McDowell; the rural
residency requirement is omitted.
144. 894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995).
145. Id. at 640.
146. Id. (quoting Tongass Sport Fishing Ass'n v. State, 866 P.2d 1314, 1318
(Alaska 1994)). The court also struck down a residence-based criterion on which
state regulatory bodies were permitted to rely in classifying subsistence users as
Tier I or Tier II users. The statute permitted state regulators to distinguish
between users based on several factors, including "the proximity of the domicile
of the subsistence user to the stock or population." ALASKA STAT. § 16.05-
.258(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1992). On the direct authority of McDowell, the court held that
this residence-based requirement violated sections 3, 15 and 17 of Article VIII of
the Alaska Constitution. Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d at 639. The court's
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Alaska's subsistence law has finally, although not completely,
survived constitutional scrutiny by the supreme court. Unfortunate-
ly, the court's holding allows state regulatory bodies to continue to
base their decisions on a vague cultural standard, rather than a
concrete analysis based in principles of sound resource manage-
ment.
Nonetheless, the primary beneficiaries of Alaska's subsistence
law are still likely to be Natives and others living in remote areas,
who remain able to live a subsistence lifestyle and fulfill their
economic needs. While the overall result may be beneficial for
Natives, the law is open to abuse and corruption because of its
flawed policy and muddled legislative intent. First, urban residents
can still take resources for subsistence purposes, even if they do not
live in subsistence areas. This feature defies rational resource
management and is a relic of a legal regime that favors nebulous
geographic rights over individual needs and responsibilities.'47
Second, the law relies upon a cultural meaning of subsistence
taking, itself a dangerous notion,"4 but also opens up such taking
to urban dwellers whose cultural context is vastly different from
that of Natives. Therefore, the law is internally inconsistent.
Finally, the law reflects the McDowell court's refusal to reconcile
the management of a limited resource with a nuanced constitutional
right to share in that common resource.' 49 In doing so, it ignores
discussion was curt. After outlining its previous decisions, the court stated:
Our holding in McDowell is controlling here. The requirements of the
equal access clauses apply to both tiers of subsistence users. Just as
eligibility to participate in all subsistence hunting and fishing cannot be
made dependent on whether one lives in an urban or rural area,
eligibility to participate in Tier II subsistence hunting and fishing cannot
be based on how close one lives to a given fish or game population.
I& at 638. Thus, the court reiterated its conviction that any subsistence classifica-
tion based on the location of the user is antagonistic to the Alaska Constitution.
147. Historically, U.S. courts have done just the opposite; individual rights are
traditionally more important than group rights. Indeed, liberal government is
based on individual rights. See generally JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE
OF GOVERNMENT 54-62 (Thomas P. Peardon ed. 1952). On the tension between
individual liberalism and civic republican group values in American history, see
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 6-7, 26
(1986).
148. This policy allows a minority to impose its vision on the majority, counter
to the tenets of liberal democracy.
149. The Alaska Constitution's Article VIII rights are nuanced in that they
impose a trust duty on the state to manage wildlife resources for the benefit of all
state residents. Boardman argues that
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the fact that an interpretation that endangers the bases for both
rights may ultimately destroy them and will, at a minimum,
postpone their final reconciliation. If a blanket subsistence right
results in dwindling natural resources, then all Alaskans' rights to
share in those resources diminishes.
Alaska legislators may have recognized these shortcomings.
They passed a delayed amendment in 1992 to the current subsis-
tence law that was to take effect on October 1, 1995.150 However,
shortly after the Alaska Supreme Court decided Kenaitze Indian
Tribe, the legislature postponed the application of the amendment
until October 1, 1996."5' This amendment will change the post-
McDowell law back to its former state, replete with a regulatory
preference for local residents if state regulators limit subsistence
uses.' Perhaps partially acknowledging the reasonableness of a
need-based limit to subsistence uses, the lawmakers seem to be
asking the supreme court to reconsider the issue and rationalize its
logic. Given the seven-year time span between McDowell and the
effective date of the amendment, it also seems that they hedged
their bets that the justices favorable to McDowell will no longer sit
on the Alaska Supreme Court.153
in the sensitive area of natural resources management, it is difficult to
benefit all of the people all of the time. Often a benefit to one group
can cause harm to another potential user... . The [court's] result
accentuated the special privileges prohibition and anti-exclusionist values
of article VIII, without reconciling the implications of this interpretation
for Alaska's natural resources and Alaska natives dependent on those
resources. Furthermore, this construction may harmonize all three
sections [(3, 15 and 17)], but it diminishes the value of the common-use
clause to the benefit of all the people of Alaska. The McDowell court
failed to realize that the granting of a special privilege, under certain
circumstances, may indeed benefit all Alaskans.
Boardman, supra note 4, at 1009.
150. Act of July 14, 1992, ch. 1, §§ 3, 12, 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws 5-8 (2d Spec.
Sess.).
151. Act effective June 6, 1995, ch. 68, § 3, 1995 Alaska Sess. Laws 2; see also
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (Supp. 1995).
152. The full text of the future amendment is found in the notes following
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1992).
153. Under the Alaska Constitution, the governor appoints supreme court
justices and superior court judges based on the nominations of a judicial
committee appointed by the state bar. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5. However,
each justice or superior court judge is subject to approval or rejection in a
nonpartisan vote at the first general election held more than three years after his
or her appointment. ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6. After that first vote, each
supreme court justice must stand for approval every ten years, and each superior
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Alaska subsistence law is still in a state of flux, without an
acceptable policy justification. Yet Alaskan subsistence resources
remain widely available; as long as use is restricted to sustenance,
resources will renew themselves. In this regard, federal wildlife
protection law poses a more troublesome problem. Its subsistence
rationales lean heavily toward a cultural basis and are at least as
confused as those in state law.
IV. SUBSISTENCE PROVISIONS IN FEDERAL WILDLIFE LAWS:
THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
Federal wildlife laws, such as the Marine Mammal Protection
Act of 1972 ("MMPA"), 1 4 contain exceptions for Alaska Natives
who rely on protected species for subsistence. Like other state and
federal subsistence laws, the justifications for these provisions are
murky. Though a necessity rationale could provide strong support
for at least some exceptions, the provisions are mainly culturally
motivated, which fosters uncertainty and leaves these laws open to
exploitation by both Natives and non-Natives.
After enacting ANILCA, "Congress passed [the MMPA] in
direct response to public outrage at the slaughter of harp seal pups
in Canada, as well as in reaction to general concerns about the
well-being of whales, porpoises, and other marine mammals."'55
The MMPA's operative language bans the taking or importing of
all marine mammals and marine mammal parts into the United
States. 5 6 In addition to exemptions for scientific research and
taking by permit, the Act grants Alaska Natives "an exclusive right
to take marine mammals, so long as it is 'not accomplished in a
wasteful manner,' for 'subsistence purposes' or to create 'authentic
Native' handicrafts or clothing."'57
court judge must stand for approval every six years. Id. This policy was explained
in Buckalew v. Holloway, 604 P.2d 240 (Alaska 1979). In Buckalew, the court
noted that the framers of the Alaska Constitution rejected the federal life tenure
model, desiring a system in which judges and justices would be accountable to the
people for their decisions. Id. at 244.
154. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1361-1407 (1994)).
155. Debra Thatcher Gilcrest, Comment, The High Price of Ivory: Seeking a
Balance for Alaska Natives and Walrus, 11 PUB. LAND L. REv. 135, 136 (1990).
See generally H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) (explaining
congressional motives behind the MMPA), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144.
156. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1994).
157. Case, supra note 7, at 1022 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)).
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Like other such laws,15 definitions found in the statute and
its implementing regulations provide some explanation for the
Alaska Native exemption. The act itself neglects to define
"subsistence," leaving that task to the Department of Commerce.
In regulations, the Department has defined the term "subsistence"
as "the use of marine mammals taken by Alaskan Natives for food,
clothing, shelter, heating, transportation, and other uses necessary
to maintain the life of the taker or those who depend upon the
taker to provide them with such subsistence."1 9  The MMPA
further explains that "'authentic native articles of handicrafts and
clothing' means items composed wholly or in some significant
respect of natural materials, and which are produced, decorated or
fashioned in the exercise of traditional native handicrafts without
the use of pantographs, multiple carvers or other mass copying
devices."'" However, this definition is open to interpretation.
For example, if traditional methods of hunting can include the use
of a snowmobile, does a fur jacket made for a Barbie doll qualify
as an authentic native handicraft?"' The Department of the
Interior has attempted to answer this question by further defining
authentic native handicrafts as items "commonly produced on or
before December 21, 1972. '"6z
The definitions themselves are easily applicable, but they do
not rely on one consistent rationale. The definition of "subsis-
tence" appears to be based on economic or physical need and is
therefore easier to interpret. However, the definition of "handi-
craft" shuns economic reasoning, as it is apparently premised on
cultural factors. While the definitions of these two terms contradict
one another, the regulations further complicate matters by
attempting to arrest Native cultural development at the end of
1972. Although the 1972 cut-off regulation may be designed to
facilitate interpretation, it has three main faults. First, it is by no
means easy for a court to discern whether a particular item was
produced traditionally before 1972. Second, the choice of date is
158. The MMPA's definitional language is mirrored by the Alaska Native
exemption in the Endangered Species Act of 1973. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994).
159. Regulations Governing the Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, 50
C.F.R. § 216.3 (1994).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b)(2) (1994).
161. See, e.g., Katelnikoff v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 657 F. Supp.
659 (D. Alaska 1986).
162. Marine Mammals, 50 C.F.R. § 18.3 (1994).
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seemingly arbitrary as well: why should 1972, and not 1872, be the
cut-off date? Finally, if the goal of the MMPA is to maintain
cultural continuity,"6 then the time limit negates that intent. If
Alaska Natives may use traditional materials to perpetuate their
cultures as they wish, it is unreasonable for the statute to deny
them the ability to make handicrafts that were not invented before
1972.
This last issue implicates an economic necessity argument,
which, as illustrated by the applicable case law, is a subtext running
throughout the legislative history of the MMPA. For example, in
United States v. Clark,'64 four Alaska Natives shot nine walruses,
a species protected by the MMPA. They removed only the heads,
the penis bones and the flippers from the carcasses, butchered one
carcass and ultimately discarded the other eight."6 Clark and his
companions were charged with violating the MMPA and its
implementing regulations, which prohibit Natives from taking
protected species in a wasteful manner."6 Clark brought an
action against the Department of the Interior, arguing that the
regulations conflicted with the MMPA's original intent. Alterna-
tively, Clark contended that if there were no conflict, then the
MMFA itself was unconstitutionally vague. 67
The court held that the regulations were within the authority
conferred on the Department of the Interior by the MMPA and
163. But see United States v. Clark, 912 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1037 (1991), in which the court focused on Senator Ted Stevens' sparse
economic reasoning. The court specifically rejected the contention that the
MMPA tries to maintain cultural continuity and evolution, arguing that
it is incongruous to find Stevens asking that the native Alaskans be free
to use all the carcass, not just part of it, while [the appellant] and amicus
argue that Stevens' position supports [the appellant's] claim.... [The
appellant] suggests that custom has now changed to the point that taking
walrus for a few parts alone (head, oosik and flippers) should be consid-
ered non-wasteful.... [B]ut that does not mean that the new custom,
if it be such, is not wasteful. It only means that Congress may have to
revisit this area of the law if it now wishes to allow native Alaskans to
take animals under the changed conditions.
Id. at 1089. Couched in these terms, this economic rationale is limitless, as long
as the Natives take the whole carcass. Such a rationale could justify slaughtering
walrus and sending their prized parts to Asia for use in aphrodisiacs, which is
clearly not a rational use of a threatened wildlife resource.
164. 912 F2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1037 (1991).
165. Id. at 1088.
166. Id. at 1088-89.
167. Id. at 1089.
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that the Act was not unconstitutionally vague, as it provided
sufficient notice to Clark that he could be held criminally responsi-
ble."6 Most importantly, the court examined Congress's legisla-
tive intent in passing the MMPA and found that Congress ground-
ed it in an economic justification.'69 After reciting a litany of
congressional statements extolling Natives' limited commercial use
of marine mammal products, the court declared that "[given] the
legislative history and the statutory text, we hold that the exemp-
tion is properly viewed as protecting subsistence hunting and use
of mammal parts for a limited cash economy, so long as neither use
is wasteful."'7
Subsequent case law has both contradicted and supported the
Clark court's conclusion that the Alaska Native exemption from the
MMPA is based on an economic need rationale. In Katelnikoff v.
United States Department of the Interior," two Alaska Natives
shot approximately thirty-five sea otters, skinned them, discarded
the carcasses and later tanned their furs." Katelnikoff used the
pelts to make crafts, including teddy bears, hats and fur flowers,
some of which were made from commercially available designs.173
Though she tagged them with an authentic handicraft stamp, 74
U.S. Fish and Wildlife officials seized them, claiming that they
violated the time-limit regulation because they were not of a sort
"commonly produced on or before December 21, 1972.""n7
Katelnikoff sued for the pelts' return, claiming that the regulations
exceeded statutory authority.76 She argued that the regulations
frustrated Congress's intent to create Native commercial enterprises
by "allow[ing] her virtually no use of sea otter pelts because of the
pre-twentieth century regulations on native uses and the species'
near extinction during the first half of this century.""
168. Id. at 1090.
169. Id. at 1089.
170. ld. (emphasis added).
171. 657 F. Supp. 659 (D. Alaska 1986).
172. Id. at 660.
173. Id. at 660-61.
174. For an example of regulations that call for a government authenticity tag,
see Use of Government Marks of Genuineness for Alaskan Indian and Alaskan
Eskimo Handmade Products, 25 C.F.R. § 310 (1994).
175. Katelnikoff, 657 F. Supp. at 661 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 18.3).
176. Id
177. 1d. at 662.
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In response, the court examined the MMPA's legislative history,
finding that "the purpose of [Senator Stevens'] amendment was to
enable natives to continue to produce native arts and crafts; what
was to be protected was the right to be left alone and to continue
in their centuries-old way of life and the chosen trade of their
forefathers."'78 Thus, the court adopted a cultural justification for
the law. In addition to other problems with this approach, the
court finessed the friction between a cultural standard and the 1972
cut-off date; the court merely stated that there are no "traditional"
uses of otters, since there were almost none available to hunt
before 1972.9 Such a cultural justification in effect freezes
Native culture at its 1972 stage of development. On the other
hand, a necessity-based approach recognizes that Natives' needs
change over time; if meeting those needs does not substantially hurt
the resource, then the sustenance-based definition allows Native
culture to adapt and grow."8
In a later, but related case, Didrickson v. United States
Department of the Interior,' the court returned to this issue.
Didrickson was charged with the violation of the same regulation
for selling a sea otter parka with snaps and zippers."l The
Department of the Interior seized the articles on the grounds that
this use was not traditional, since snaps and zippers were not
commonly used in otter parkas before 1972."8 Although the
court invalidated the pertinent regulation, it did not completely
repudiate a culturally based rationale for the MMPA.18 It held
instead that under section 1371(b) of the MMPA, the Secretary of
the Interior may regulate Native handicrafts only if an animal stock
is depleted. "Had Congress intended to authorize the Secretary to
maintain any particular harvest level for purposes of the exception,
it would have explicitly given the Secretary such power....
Section 1371(b) is clearly intended to limit the Secretary's authori-
178. Id. at 665. The court also noted that though Congress sought to encourage
authentic handicrafts, "more striking is that body's concern with the preservation
of traditional aspects of native culture and lifestyle." Id. at 666.
179. Id. at 667.
180. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
181. 796 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Alaska 1991), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1992).
182. Id. at 1284.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1291.
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ty."' The court reasoned that Congress did not intend the
Department to "gap-fill" the MMPA by ordering a 1972 cut-off
date.86 Consequently, the court invalidated the 1972 cut-off
regulation, stating instead that "traditional" uses are those that
have occurred throughout Native Alaskan history."s As a result,
Didrickson's use of the otter pelts was traditional within the
requirements of the Alaska Native exception to the MMPA; the
court could "hardly think of anything more 'traditional' to an
Alaskan native than making a parka made from animal fur and
exchanging it for some other useful item."'"
The Didrickson court's reasoning is best supported by a
necessity argument: snaps and zippers should be allowed because
they allow the Natives to participate better in a limited cash
economy and because parkas are traditional uses of animal pelts.
Yet the court's language endorses a cultural reading of the law. If
the 1972 cut-off is stricken, then Katelnikoff can once again make
her fur flowers, and perhaps even a fur stole for a Barbie doll, as
long as these items are "authentic." The court effectively adopted
the broadest cultural reasoning possible, allowing widespread
Native use of protected animals under the guise of traditional and
authentic uses. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's acceptance of a cultural
justification for the law,"8 insisting that "authentic" uses are those
"done in traditional native ways."'" As did the district court, the
court of appeals adopted a broad cultural definition that allows
traditional uses to be any new use, as long as it meets the MMPA's
other production criteria.''
The most plausible explanation for the various interpretations
of Congress's intent in enacting the MMPA is that the legislative
record supports both a cultural and an economic motivation.
185. Id. This result seems to conflict, at least in spirit, with Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which instructed lower
courts generally to defer to agency interpretations of their own substantive statutes
if the law is ambiguous. On this issue, the MMPA appears ambiguous, since two
courts interpreted the statute in very different ways.
186. Didrickson, 796 F. Supp. at 1288.
187. Id. at 1289.
188. Id. at 1290.
189. Didrickson v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 982 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.
1992).
190. Id. at 1342.
191. IL
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During the floor debate on the bill, Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska
championed the cause of Native subsistence takers from his state.
He introduced scores of telegrams and letters into the record
justifying an exception on both theories.'" Stevens's legislative
partner, Alaska Representative Nick Begich, framed his argument
in terms of cultural continuity:
[I]n spite of intervening pressures of great magnitude, a cultural
system centering on subsistence still thrives in some regions of
Alaska, and ocean mammals play an important role in maintain-
ing the subsistence level. I would make it very clear that it is
incumbent on all of us to respect this situation and [to] approach
actions which would alter it with great care.19
Later, Senator Stevens even hinted that subsistence taking should
include the ability of the Eskimo Foods company to can seal
meat, 94 a practice that is difficult to justify on either cultural or
sustenance grounds. Mechanically canning seal meat for later
consumption is certainly not a time-honored practice among Aleuts
leading a distinct Native lifestyle; nor is it part of a sustenance
existence, since it relies on modem technology to preserve and
distribute the canned product. Rather, it is a simple legal exclusion
from the clear mandate of the MMPA requested by an interest
group wishing to better its economic position.
During March 1972 floor debates, Stevens continued to confuse
the issue, first arguing that without an exception for Natives, the
MMPA would make Natives "face the certain fate of cultural
extinction."'95 Later, in the June 1972 debates, he stated that "if
this exception were not included, Alaskan Natives would lose their
traditional way of life, the way they have lived for centuries.' 196
192. Ocean Mammal Protection, 1972: Hearings on the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 before the Subcomm. on Oceans and the Atmosphere of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 734-39 (1972).
193. Ocean Mammals, 1972: Hearings on the Marine Mammal Protection Act of
1972 before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1972).
194. 118 CONG. REc. 8400 (1972) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
195. Id. Since culture is an evolutionary process, not a time-bound object,
Stevens' logic is not squarely on point. Such a fear should not form the basis for
laws, since Native subsistence culture is derivative of Natives' physical need for the
resources in question.
196. 118 CONG. REC. 25,258 (1972). Striking a painfully earnest tone, Stevens
claimed that
Alaskan arts and crafts are an artistic and social heritage. This skill,
handed down from generation to generation, reveals as much of their
history as paintings [of] Rembrandt and other famous European artists
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This statement provided the Katelnikoff court with the basis for a
cultural justification. However, Senator Stevens apparently never
considered why the Natives would lose their traditional way of life.
They would do so because they rely on these resources for practical
reasons; in short, they need the available food.
In his March 1972 statements, Stevens again avoided the
obvious sustenance argument, claiming that "the Alaska Native
needs cash. If he is to have the choice to live where his people
have dwelt for centuries, he must be permitted to make a living
there."'" Stevens made no mention of taking for nutritional
purposes. Rather, he chose to work the Natives into the cash
economy: "[T]he only industry that the Alaska Native can count
on to support himself and his family is one based upon full
utilization of the ocean mammals. ... This is an industry of Native
manufacture, handicrafts and carving."' ' This rationale allowed
the Clark court to argue that the law is grounded in an economic
concern, albeit one that ignores a more readily defensible economic
justification that conserves Native hunting and fishing culture.
Stevens failed to see that infusing cash into the Native economy is
a sure way to alter old habits and "traditional" culture. Instead, he
praised the fact that "snowmobiles have largely replaced dog
sleds.""1
The equivocal legislative history and case law is betrayed by
the Natives' quick response to this political and economic threat.
The Natives responded as any rational interest group would; they
lobbied Congress for protection from change. Their reaction in
flooding Stevens's office with telegrams and testimony'w demon-
strates their ability to play by the rules of the Western system of
government and questions the need to ascribe culturally distinct
motives to their subsistence taking. Furthermore, it is difficult to
understand how Alaska Native hunting and fishing practices are
culturally different from those of other Native Americans.0 1 A
reveals [sic] of the white man's past history. Removing the privilege of
passing this cultural legacy to future generations will sever children as yet
unborn from the past. It will create a cultural diaspora.
Id at 25,259.
197. 118 CoNG. REC. 8401 (1972) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., United States v. Kaneholani, 773 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (D. Haw.
1990) (holding that Alaska Native subsistence exemptions under the Endangered
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need-based approach would not fall prey to such inconsistencies.
Alaska Natives are more remote from affordable store-bought food
than many, if not most, Native Americans.
However, even in Alaska, the subsistence need of some Native
groups is different than that of others. After oil was discovered on
Inupiat land, Warren Matumeak, a tribal elder, stated that "'things
have changed for the better. We have schools, roads, firefighting
equipment. Our houses have kitchens and flush toilets and T.V.'s.
It's sad that some people think that we should have to go back to
the old ways.""'m While things may not have changed for the
better for all Inupiats, surely Matumeak has a different subsistence
need than members of the Gwich'in tribe, who live in remote
villages on oil-free lands and remain dependent on caribou for
sustenance.' Embracing the cultural model treats these different
cultures identically, filtering out the disparate needs of very
different lifestyles.
In addition, the Native handicraft exemption has caused an
even more pernicious side effect. Since cultural expectations evolve
over time in response to changing material conditions, the excep-
tion cannot be limited to those who sell traditional Native wares.
Especially after the African elephant ivory ban went into effect,'
Species Act are applicable to Alaska Natives only). The court stated that the
Alaska Native exemptions were driven by a need to preserve social unity but that
there was no such need in Hawaii. "While some native Hawaiians may choose to
isolate themselves from the conveniences of modem society, most native
Hawaiians do not live in areas so remote that access to conventional food supplies
is virtually non-existent." Id. at 1397. This logic easily could be extended to
Alaska Natives: Why do they choose to live in isolated villages when they can just
as easily move to the cities? In a fit of circular logic, the court seems to think that
subsistence activity is culturally stronger in Alaska primarily because Native
Alaskans have traditionally pursued broad subsistence activities, while Native
Hawaiians have not.
202. Egan, supra note 42 (quoting Warren Matumeak).
203. Id. Egan notes that, according to Gwich'in leader Sarah James, "'the
Gwich'in are caribou people. For thousands of years we have lived with caribou
right where we are today. We're talking about an Indian nation that still lives on
the land and depends on this herd. In my village, about 75 percent of our protein
comes from caribou."' Id. (quoting Sarah James).
204. See Elephant Skin and Bones, ECONOMIST, Feb. 29, 1992, at 48. For an
interesting discussion on wildlife preservation, including ivory and the North
Pacific Fur Seal Treaty, see Birds and Bees; Governments are Trying to use Treaties
to Prevent Extinction, in Survey: the Environment, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at
15.
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this entitlement created tremendous incentives for poor Natives to
make some quick cash by selling ivory and walrus parts in Asian
markets, where the demand for ivory remains high.' As United
States v. Clark illustrates, Natives will butcher walruses for just a
few pieces, including the tusks and the oosik, or penis bone.'
Poaching has become so rampant that "Alaskan native carvers
report a shortage of walrus ivory for their own needs."' Ac-
cording to Jim Sheridan, a special agent at the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service's Anchorage office, "'the black market is trading
as much in drugs-if not more-than in cash.... We have a case
where the whole head... might have been worth $300 to $500, but
it was going for six [marijuana] joints.' ' 2
Unfortunately, as Didrickson demonstrates, courts can regulate
Native taking of species protected by the MMPA only if the taking
in question is "wasteful" and if the species taken is classified as
"depleted."'  According to Debra Gilcrest, non-wasteful Native
taking of walrus and other resources is becoming more rare,210
and waiting for the Department of Commerce to list the walrus as
"depleted" may come too late to save the herds.211 Yet poaching
continues under the current legal regime, feeding cash into poor
Native communities. This trade underscores the folly of the
culturally driven Native takings exceptions. These "traditional"
205. See generally Gilcrest, supra note 155, at 144-46.
206. 912 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1037 (1991). The oosik
is highly sought as an aphrodisiac in Asia. Alaska Representative Don Young
recently urged U.S. Fish and Wildlife Director Mollie Beattie to allow Natives to
sell uncarved oosiks as Native handicrafts in Asian markets, undercutting any
cultural justifications that the subsistence exception might still retain. See In the
Loop: That's Pronounced Ooow Sick, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1994, at A17.
207. Michael Parrish, Hunting with Gun and Chain Saw: A New Threat to the
Pacific Walrus, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1990, H2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allnws File.
208. Id. (quoting Jim Sheridan).
209. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1994).
210. Gilcrest, supra note 155, at 144. "The exploding Japanese market for
salmon roe has led to many cases in which the Natives who are fishing will simply
gather the eggs and discard the rest of the salmon." Id. Gilcrest also notes that
the four-fold increase in the price of ivory in 1980 corresponded with an increasing
number of headless walruses turning up on Alaska shores. Id. at 144-45. See also
Clark, 912 F.2d at 1089 (finding the taking of the head, flippers and oosik to be
wasteful).
211. Ken Schoolcraft, Jr., Congress Amends the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
62 OR. L. REV. 257, 289-90 (1983).
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communities are now being subjected to the problems of the drug
trade, fueled by entitlements designed to preserve a centuries-old
culture. Furthermore, the demand for cash in these areas itself
undermines the claim that Native communities are culturally or
socially distinct. While they may be different, individual Natives
have had so much contact with Western society that they have
acquired Western economic desires. If some Natives cannot resist
the temptations of an economic or pharmacological fix for their
troubled communities, then subsistence law cannot rest on cultural
assumptions that are at best patronizing and at worst destructive.
The MMPA offers disincentives for rational resource alloca-
tion. Its definitions are vague, and, although the legislative history
of Congress's intent is murky, it reflects an overriding culturally
oriented justification for the Alaska Native exception. Instead of
establishing a cultural right to use marine mammals, as in Katel-
nikoff and Didrickson, or cementing a limitless notion of a blubber
and oosik-based cash economy, implicit in Clark,212 Congress
should adopt a need-based justification for the exception. Such a
justification would function as a type of property right; Natives who
lead sustenance lifestyles, such as the Gwich'in, and especially
Natives living along the coast, would be able to take protected
marine mammals because they need the animals for food and for
craft materials for personal use in a non-cash economy. Any
loosening of this standard would be susceptible to the manipulation
of "Bic-pen" scrimshaw'13 and other techniques designed to
exploit the exclusive MMPA taking entitlements by selling marine
mammal products in the world market.
212. United States v. Clark, 912 F.2d 1087,1089 (9th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498
U.S. 1037 (1991) ("A close examination of the genesis of the bill demonstrates that
the subsistence exemption is intended to clarify that the meat, blubber, and organs
need not be used for subsistence, but may also be used as the basis of a cash
economy.").
213. Bic-pen scrimshaw refers to a method used by Alaska Natives to comply
with the MMPA's handicraft carving conditions while actually preserving the ivory
tusks for sale in Asia. According to Michael Parrish:
Native Alaskans are allowed to sell raw ivory to each other, and to sell
ivory to non-natives it if has been crafted in traditional ways-such as
scrimshaw, or being carved into traditional animal statues. In fact, one
trick used by traders to avoid the Marine Mammal Act is termed "Bic-
pen scrimshaw," for carving so limited and light that the marks can be
easily sanded off-after it has been sold as legally handicrafted ivory.
Parrish, supra note 207.
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V. CONCLUSION
[T]he self-sufficient days of living off the land are over; the
average [Alaska] Native lives in a village, splitting time between
subsistence hunting and fishing, and trying to make enough
money for such necessities as ammunition, hunting gear, heating
oil, house payments or rent, food and clothes. A typical village's
isolation makes these items horribly expensive. Heating oil,
flown in from Kodiak, costs Akhiok residents $117 for a 55-
gallon barrel, which during the winter lasts about two weeks in
most households. Some 40 percent of Natives are on public
assistance. 4
Given these hardships, it makes sense to allow Alaska Natives
to use the resources around them for their survival. However,
basing such a right in ideas of cultural autonomy or preservation
instead of human need is dangerous. Doing so ultimately risks
upsetting a delicate balance between human needs and rational
resource preservation. Among numerous other flaws in the cultural
paradigm, non-quantifiable and malleable value choices factored
into wildlife management create uncertainty, which threatens long-
term wildlife resource planning and protection. More importantly,
a cultural justification allows certain groups to claim an entitlement
based not on need but on an unwillingness to change.
While this Article has been concerned primarily with criticism
of the dominant culturally based subsistence model, perhaps an
alternative vision would be useful: Alaska Natives should be
allowed to choose their own future,2 - at least as long as that
choice does not endanger the long-term survival of wildlife popula-
tions. Although Natives' desire to conserve the real or imagined
status quo connects them to other interest groups, such as farmers
or loggers, they are different in an important respect.2 6  A
necessity-based subsistence exception to a rational resource
management plan would permit Natives to retain the basic contours
of their culture' while molding their lifestyles to accommodate
214. Sharpsteen, supra note 1.
215. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
216. Of course, Alaska Natives are also subjugated peoples to some degree;
even the most virulently pro-timber logger or successfully subsidized farmer cannot
claim that dubious honor. Still, factoring historical guilt into the equation leads
policy makers back to the culturally based paradigm, whose evident flaws argue
against its retention. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
217. Other interest groups, like farmers, would not be able to maintain their
traditional ways of life if national resources were managed to meet the twin goals
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the sustainable use and preservation of wildlife populations.2" A
need-based justification would also recognize the value that Natives
place in traditional hunting but demand that that practice reflect
necessity and sustainable resource use, touchstones that are
overlooked in current subsistence laws.
A general reconception of subsistence laws might take one of
three forms, all of which seek to preserve wildlife resources. First,
the subsistence taking exceptions simply could be excised from
wildlife protection laws. Second, a licensing scheme could be
established, which would allow Natives to take certain wildlife
species for reasons of necessity. Third, an entitlement trading
scheme based upon the emission credit trading system could be
established within Native communities.
At first glance, simply outlawing subsistence taking might solve
the problem of species preservation and, at the same time, avoid a
cultural justification for Native wildlife uses. After all, if subsis-
tence hunting is outlawed, then wildlife resources would be in less
danger of overuse. Unfortunately, such a scenario is unlikely after
ANCSA and the onset of a full-fledged cash economy among
Alaska Natives. Curtailing even need-based subsistence hunting for
Natives probably would exacerbate the taking abuse problem. If
Natives in need of food, cash or household items could no longer
legally take animals to support themselves, economic pressures
would compel them to find some other way to survive. If the
animals could not be taken legally, then they would be taken
illegally. Apart from taking animals for their food value, Natives
likely would increase their takes of animals whose parts would
of producing the most efficient use of existing resources and preserving as much
of those resources as possible for future generations. For example, American
farmers would likely lose most of their family farms if agriculture subsidies were
discontinued, since those payments shift national resources to inefficient methods
of food production.
218. A good example is the experience of the ancient Hebrews, who could no
longer practice sacrifice after the Temple at Jerusalem was destroyed. With no
physical place for sacrifice, that facet of the culture was abandoned, but the
religion and culture continued to evolve. They became text-based, not geographi-
cally based, as rabbis and scholars interpreted texts in light of their Diaspora
experiences. See generally MAX I. DIMONT, JEWS, GOD AND HISTORY 64-65, 71,
112 (1962); JOSEPH TELUSHKiN, JEWISH LITERACY 61, 137 (1991); Gerson D.
Cohen, The Talmudic Age, in GREAT AGES AND IDEAS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE
165-66, 177-78 (Leo Scharz ed., 1956); Robert Goldenberg, Talmud, in BACK TO
THE SOURCES 129 (Barry W. Holtz ed., 1984).
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fetch the highest market price. Thus, even more tusks and oosiks
would appear in Asian markets if a total subsistence taking ban
were established. Cutting the food and income stream to belea-
guered Native communities is unlikely to preserve animal popula-
tions, even though it technically would eliminate Native taking
based on a cultural justification.
Instead of completely eliminating Native subsistence provi-
sions, a licensing scheme could be established based on economic
need or necessity. The government could parcel out licenses
according to both economic need and the populations of Natives
relative to animal populations. This method would eliminate a
cultural justification in its definition of subsistence taking, and it
would allow certain Natives to maintain their present ability to take
the animals they need to survive.
However, this plan presents more than a few problems. First,
it explicitly employs needs testing in its allocation of the taking
entitlement, a practice generally shunned by entitlement programs.
It is perhaps unfair to test the neediness of a population that
historically has been maltreated and subjugated, while at the same
time wealthy senior citizens collect social security checks. Second,
the licensing scheme assumes that vast government sums could be
spent in establishing and policing a licensing system; it is unclear
from where this money would come. Moreover, simply restricting
the number and type of kills that Natives could make would not
necessarily cut down the number of wasteful kills. If nothing is
offered in trade for the Natives' lost profits from black market
animal parts, the economic incentive to kill for these uses would
remain.
A subsistence entitlement trading scheme might avoid the
problems posed by these two solutions. Such a system would allow
the Alaska Native community as a whole to decide how best to use
a limited number of taking credits by employing the market
mechanism to sort out a myriad of different value choices.
Certainly the market is not flawless, but, as noted earlier, the post-
ANCSA universe is irretrievably market-based. ANCSA was a
watershed piece of legislation whose policies are now the founda-
tion for distinct, investment-backed expectations. Even though the
ANCSA land lottery created Native winners and losers, an
entitlement trading scheme could use that wealth disparity to
address the different needs and desires for Native taking rights
across the entire Native community.
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Making use of the existing ANCSA structure, an entitlement
trading system would assign a set number of taking rights to Native
corporations whose members depend on animal hunting to survive.
This taking would be a need-based right; in its initial allocation of
entitlements, the system would distribute taking rights only to
groups who depend on subsistence to survive. The taking entitle-
ments could be exercised only within that Native corporation's
geographic area, and only if the wildlife populations could sustain
that use based on government-conducted population surveys.
The corporations would then distribute the taking entitlements
to their members. The Native corporations that "won" the
ANCSA lottery, that is, those that received tracts of resource-rich
land, would not receive entitlements in the initial distribution, since
the system would assume that these rich corporations would have
the resources to spread the oil wealth among their members. Yet
after this initial allocation of entitlements, and after a thorough
process of teaching Alaska Natives how the scheme operates, some
but not all of the entitlements could be traded for cash with
members of the "rich" Native corporations, those who did not
receive entitlements in the initial allocation. The market would
allow individuals to make trade-offs between their ability to hunt
for a living and their ability to take money in exchange for that
right. The reserve entitlements, those that could not be traded,
would ensure that the members of the poorer Native corporations
would be able to eke out a bare existence if they traded away all
of their tradeable rights for little value.
This system would use an economic need-based definition of
subsistence for its initial allocation, yet it would allow individual
Natives to judge exactly what "need" means. For some, need
translates into calories to survive; for others, need consists of
participating in a ritual hunt. By allowing Natives to value these
uses for themselves, the trading system would not obliquely accept
a cultural subsistence definition. Rather, it would utilize an
explicitly economically oriented subsistence definition in its initial
allocation. By allowing Natives to assign their own values to these
entitlements, the trading system would recast one of ANCSA's
chief weaknesses into a strength. ANCSA assigned some Native
corporations distinctly "better" land, in a capitalist sense, than it
did to others. The trading scheme would lead those rich corpora-
tions to redistribute the ANCSA wealth through the entitlement
trading market.
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For example, an Alaska Native that sits on the board of a
successful, oil-rich native corporation simply may not need to hunt
seals or walruses to make a few extra dollars. Nevertheless, the
seal or walrus hunt may still have symbolic meaning for that
individual. If the board member values the hunt ritual enough, he
or she can pay for the right to continue the hunt by sharing oil
wealth with a poorer Native community. In this way, the trading
system reinforces community identity and distributes the ANCSA
land wealth more fairly, by recognizing the responsibility the
lottery-rich Natives have toward their poorer community members
and by allowing the Natives themselves to choose how to allocate
many of the taking entitlements.
As do the other suggestions, the trading scheme has its faults.
It still allows individuals to take animals based on cultural
motivations, even though it does not expressly enshrine those
cultural rationales. The problem of means testing a historically
maltreated population also arises, as it did in the licensing system,
in that it may not be fair for the government to choose the winners
of the initial allocation based purely on wealth and need. In
addition, the trading system may be overly reliant on cash as a
method of equalizing economic disparity without taking its harmful
effects into account. As the critics of the ANCSA system point
out, fully embracing a cash economy drives some individuals to
poach walrus and bears. It is questionable whether the trading
system's strong emphasis on the cash medium and the market
mechanism would exacerbate that problem by legitimizing cash as
a universal good.219 Moreover, unless the educational program
is very strong and enacted over a long period of time before the
initial allocation, the market mechanism might favor the wealthy
Native corporations that are accustomed to the capitalist system
and accordingly possess stronger bargaining power.
Yet when judged against other possible solutions, the taking
entitlement trading system is the best equipped to achieve the goal
of sustainable wildlife use. It is a compromise that allows Natives
to choose their own future by valuing the right to take wildlife,
while also protecting the long-term survival of those species. The
enactment of such a scheme would undoubtedly alter the tradition-
al lifestyles of some of the Natives. However, in the long run, that
219. Note, however, that the trading scheme could reduce the pressure to trade
in ivory and oosik by redistributing wealth across the Native population.
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change will help to preserve healthy wildlife populations. Since
Native culture and traditions are based upon the existence of those
populations, modifying the "traditional" Native lifestyle by
changing the subsistence regime to embrace an entitlement trading
system and shunning cultural taking justifications may be Alaska
Natives' best chance to maintain the basic cultural continuity of
their communities.

